Using novel survey data on technology licensing, we report the first empirical evidence linking the three main sources of market failure emphasized in the market design literature (lack of market thickness, lack of market safety, congestion) to licensing outcomes. Recognizing that licensing is rarely a simple transaction but often a long and complex process, we pinpoint when, across three stages in the licensing process, each source of failure is salient. Perhaps surprisingly, a lack of market thickness is not correlated with deal failure in the latter stages of the negotiation process, underscoring the bilateral monopoly conditions under which licensing often occurs, unaffected by the shadow of competition. In contrast, market safety, conferred, for example, through formal intellectual property protection, is only salient in the final stage of the licensing process, reflecting the dynamics of investing in legal due diligence. While some bargaining frictions (congestion) are salient, as the literature would suggest, others commonly associated with licensing problems are unexpectedly not correlated with deal failure in our data. Finally, likely owing to the embryonic nature of their inventions, universities are more likely than firms to experience failure in the first stage of the process (identifying a buyer) but are less likely to incur deal failure in reaching an agreement in the final stage, perhaps due to the nature of faculty and administration incentives. *
Introduction
Technology licensing plays a significant and expanding role in economic growth and the diffusion of knowledge. The size of this market increased by more than three times between 1995 and 2002 in terms of transaction value (Arora and Gambardella, 2010) . Robbins (2006) estimates that domestic income from licensing intellectual property in the United States was approximately $50 billion in 2002, and Arora and Gambardella (2010) estimate that the global market for technology was about $100 billion in the same year.
1 Given the social value often associated with innovation, these estimates may greatly understate the total welfare benefits that result from technology licensing transactions.
However, as in any sector, gains from trade in technology-related ideas can only be fully realized by an active, efficient, and fully functional market. Yet growing anecdotal evidence suggests many potential transactions fail to occur. Furthermore, in terms of scale, Rivette and Klein (2000) claim "a staggering $1 trillion in [ignored] intellectual property asset wealth" is foregone in the U.S. More formally, management scholars and economists have identified certain transaction costs, such as Arrow's Paradox (Arrow, 1962) , moral hazard (Arora, 1996) , and hold-up problems (Pisano, 1991) , that are particularly high in the licensing context and potentially lead to market failure.
The market design literature applies structure to these transaction costs and suggests that licensing may be particularly susceptible to market failure because certain features of the market are lacking and thus compromise efficient trades. Roth (2007 Roth ( , 2008 focuses on three features associated with efficient markets: 1) market thickness (buyers and sellers have opportunities to trade with a wide range of potential transactors), 2) non-congestion 1 Both Robbins (2006) and Arora and Gambardella (2001) assume that the proportion of technology licensing, as opposed to licensing of trademarks, copyrights and packaged software, is the same as that in cross-border transactions, which implies that licensing of industrial processes amounted to $66 billion. Of this, around $50 billion was earned domestically. Arora and Gambardella (2010) assume that the US accounts for 60% of the global market for technology, which implies that the global market for technology in 2002 was about $100 billion.
(transaction speed is sufficiently rapid to ensure market clearing but slow enough to allow participants to seek alternatives), and 3) market safety (agents do not have incentives for misrepresentation or strategic action that undermines the ability of others to evaluate potential trades). Gans and Stern (2010) consider well-established economic properties of the technology sector in the context of these market design principles and conclude that licensing is particularly susceptible to market failure since these three features are often lacking. We bring technology licensing data to this framework (for the first time, to our knowledge) in precisely the setting considered by Gans and Stern. Specifically, we utilize unique survey data that we have collected from 600 technology-oriented organizations in collaboration with the Licensing Executives Society (LES). The firms in our sample come from a variety of industries and are relatively large; the average firm in our sample has annual revenues between $1 billion and $10 billion. The data are at the firm level and not only include general licensing information but also responses to specific questions regarding deal failure during the licensing process.
We recognize that licensing is rarely a simple transaction but rather a usually long and complicated process. For example, LES cautions practitioners in its primer on licensing:
"Licensors be warned, the process of finding a licensee can be discouraging, not only because of the unavoidable rejections involved in the process, but also because of the time and effort required" (Licensing Executives Society, 2009) . To this end, we interviewed experts at LES to identify three distinct stages of the licensing process. This allows us to add granularity to our analysis so that we can better understand when during the process each type of market failure is salient. Specifically, we categorize licensing activities into three stages: 1) identifying a buyer/seller, 2) initiating negotiations, and 3) reaching an agreement. While each of these stages is itself complex, dividing the process into the three stages provides useful insights.
We examine sources of deal failure in the context of the Roth (2007 Roth ( , 2008 and Gans and Stern (2010) 
framework (hereafter, RGS).
2 Specifically, we examine when during the licensing process each type of market failure highlighted by RGS is salient. We describe our main findings for each below.
It is not surprising that market thickness is salient in the first stage of the licensing process (identifying a buyer/seller); identifying a licensee is harder when the market is thin.
Perhaps more surprising is that market thickness is not correlated with deal success in the two latter stages. This underscores the bilateral monopoly conditions under which licensing negotiations often occur (Anton and Yao, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2000) . While many bilateral negotiations are influenced by the shadow of competition, this does not seem to be the case in this setting. Gans and Stern (2010) point out that in the market for technology, the value of outside options is diminished as a result of negotiations due to value rivalry since "users' willingness to pay for ideas may decline with the level of diffusion of that idea." Thus, rivalry curtails the influence of potential outside parties and limits the ability of participants to consider alternative offers. Another though not mutually exclusive explanation is that parties that anticipate deal failure in the later stages of negotiations due to market thickness issues avoid initiating interactions at the outset and so select out of the process in advance.
In contrast to market thickness, which is only salient in the first stage of the licensing process, market safety, which we measure as the percentage of IP that is not effectively protectable by patents, trademarks, etc., is only correlated with deal success in the final stage: reaching an agreement. This is likely due to the dynamics of legal due diligence. Due to the cost of conducting due diligence, many firms only engage in the process after they have determined the general feasibility of reaching an agreement. Negotiating parties may be less likely to reach an agreement when sellers are hesitant to provide full disclosure due to expropriation risk (or buyers are hesitant to pay after they have appropriated), consistent with Arrow's Paradox (Arrow, 1962) . Interestingly, firms do not seem to anticipate market safety issues; market safety is not correlated with deal success in the first or second stages of the licensing process.
Bargaining frictions, our operationalization of "congestion," are correlated with deal failure in the negotiation stage. In particular, we find that the firms most likely to fail to initiate negotiations are the ones that have higher perceived costs of due diligence. This may be because they have less experience or in-house capability (and thus a higher marginal cost to carry out due diligence). Consistent with expectations, the inability to arrive at mutually acceptable financial terms as well as too many parties at the table are also salient frictions in the second stage. Notably, none of these frictions are correlated with deal failure in the final stage of the process (reaching an agreement). However, frictions caused by legal and regulatory problems (e.g., antitrust) are salient in the final stage. Interestingly, market participants do not seem to anticipate these problems, since these frictions are not correlated with deal failure in the first stage of the licensing process (identifying a buyer/seller).
Furthermore, several other frictions commonly associated with licensing problems, such as inability to agree on non-financial terms (e.g., exclusivity and scope), poor negotiating skills, ego, lack of trust, and delay are not correlated with deal failure in any of the three stages.
While experts cite these as common sources of deal failure (LESI, 2002), we find no evidence of their effects in these data.
Next, we compare deal failures for universities versus firms. Although we do not find universities to be more or less sensitive than firms to any of the three market design features, we do find them to be more likely to experience deal failure in the first stage of the licensing process. This may be because of a lower probability of product-market fit due to the embryonic nature of many university inventions (Jensen and Thursby, 2001) . At the same time, universities are less likely than firms to experience deal failure in the final stage of the process (reaching an agreement). This may be due to the incentives faced by technol-ogy transfer offices and faculty (Thursby and Thursby, 2002; Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby, 2003; Thursby, Thursby, and Gupta-Mukherjee, 2007) , which are distinct from those of firms since they do not consider competing in the product market as an outside option and also place value on the utilization of their inventions.
Overall, we offer three contributions in this paper. First, given the paucity of data on licensing in general and on deal failures in particular, we exploit firm-level variation in market features and deal success in our data to offer the first empirical evidence (correlations) relating market features to deal outcomes in the context of licensing. We cannot make causal claims concerning how a specific feature, such as lack of market thickness, causes deal failure since our data is cross-sectional and also based on perception rather than action (we use results from a survey). Nevertheless, our correlations offer evidence that is consistent with the causal interpretations suggested by theory. In terms of prior research, other papers have focused on how certain factors, such as the presence of multiple technology holders (Fosfuri, 2006) , patent effectiveness (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006) , and institutional prestige (Sine, Shane, and Di Gregorio, 2003) , affect a firm's propensity to license. However, these papers do not empirically examine the relationship between the three main market features highlighted in the market design literature and the rate of deal success. Anand and Khanna (2000) provide one of the few econometric investigations into the rate of licensing. However, their study is aggregated at the sector level; they do not examine firm level differences in licensing rates.
Our second contribution is that we report three distinct stages in the licensing process based on expert interviews and then use this disaggregation of the process to describe variation in the timing of when each market feature is most relevant. Finally, our third contribution is that we show how the relationship between market features and deal failure is mediated by organization type (universities versus firms) and industry type (healthcare versus software and electronics) in ways that can be explained by their economic properties.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we identify three distinct stages in the licensing process and discuss why the salience of each market feature may vary by stage. Then we describe our survey data and explain our empirical methodology. Finally, we report our results and then conclude with policy implications and directions for future research.
Discrete Stages of the Licensing Process
While systematic licensing frictions at different stages of the licensing process seem intuitive and are frequent in practice, they have not been examined empirically. We categorize licensing activities into three discrete stages: 1) identifying a buyer/seller, 2) initiating negotiations, and 3) reaching an agreement, which allows us to add granularity to our analysis so that we can pinpoint when during the process each type of market failure is salient. Each of these stages is itself complex. For example, with respect to the second stage, in advance of a negotiation, a party may spend many months defining business objectives, assessing leverage, researching the other party, deciding positions on key terms, preparing documentation, and protecting IP, among other tasks. In addition, each negotiating party needs to decide on its legal counsel and which parties to bring to the table (WIPO, 2004) . Even so, we believe dividing the process into the three stages provides significant insights.
Below, we present a loose theoretical extension on how various market features may come into play at different stages of the licensing transaction. We also sharpen the conceptualization of congestion in licensing by linking it to key transaction costs that arise during the bargaining process between buyers and sellers. Note that while our extension presents a useful and illustrative framework for thinking about discrete elements of the licensing process, it is neither exhaustive nor rigorous.
A market is thick if it brings together a large enough proportion of potential transactors at the same time (Roth, 2007 (Roth, , 2008 . If the market is thin, a natural implication is that the likelihood of finding potential buyers or sellers is lower, all else equal. Anecdotal evidence suggests that finding a potential licensor or a licensee largely relies on old-fashioned word-ofmouth networking and research (Licensing Executives Society, 2009 ). "Individuals may not know about particular needs or know the right individuals to contact ... Because that process relies heavily on personal networking, it may take up to 18 months (or more) to find a buyer and to negotiate a deal" (Yet2.com ).
3 Given that the first stage of the licensing process we examine is related to finding potential parties to transact with, it is straightforward to show that thickness is likely to be an important market feature in the first stage.
In the early stages of the bargaining process, the main transaction cost stems from acquiring sufficient information about the deal. Given the heterogeneity of ideas for sale, one of the main challenges that arises in the market for ideas is the cost of conducting due diligence on the "fair" price to pay for the technology and evaluating its potential market prospects. Whereas licensing a tangible object, such as a house, also faces substantial heterogeneity in the products available, it is relatively straightforward to assess the relevant attributes of the product because there are many comparable transactions on the market.
In contrast, substantial information asymmetry exists when licensing technology. Furthermore, licensing is typically conducted on a bilateral basis, which means both parties agree to limit contact with other potential buyers and sellers for a certain amount of time.
In the absence of a multilateral exchange environment, it is difficult and costly to conduct due diligence on various aspects of the deal. While a seller can do due diligence on the buyer by examining the kinds of products it has brought to the marketplace and how successful they have been (Licensing Executives Society, 2009; Troy and Werle, 2008) , both parties cannot fully assess outside alternatives due to bilateral secrecy, and there is often significant uncertainty regarding the fair price for an idea of a given quality. Indeed, Lemley and Myhrvold (2008) label the market for patents as "blind.': "Want to know if you are getting 3 Yet2.com is one of the leading online marketplaces for technology.
a good deal on a patent license or technology acquisition? Too bad" (Lemley and Myhrvold, 2008) .
Given the cost and difficulty of conducting due diligence on an IP deal in a bilateral environment, many prospective buyers and sellers are reluctant to start substantive negotiations and are often slow to enter into an agreement (Licensing Executives Society, 2009).
Not surprisingly, some buyers purchase an option, or an exclusive right, to assess the idea before starting negotiations. Otherwise, the only viable option in a bilateral environment is to start negotiations in good faith.
In later stages of the bargaining process, the main transaction cost stems from contracting problems and opportunism. Once negotiations begin, a variety of contracting problems can arise that may lead to negotiation breakdown. As a result of bounded rationality, both parties cannot foresee all the contingencies that might arise and incorporate them into the contract (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1999 . In particular, disagreements over financial and non-financial terms of the deal, such as the scope of the IP, can lead to bargaining breakdown. Having multiple parties at the negotiating table can also holdup the deal and delay reaching an agreement. In the last stage of the licensing process where substantive negotiations have started, important details regarding the technology are revealed to all parties. The paradox of disclosure becomes salient because revealing the idea to multiple sellers also reduces the individual val-uation of the idea by each seller (Arrow, 1962 protection increases the likelihood that market participants will disclose their preferences truthfully and minimizes the likelihood that they will engage in ex post opportunistic behavior once the seller reveals important details of the idea in the course of negotiation. Thus, having market safety increases the likelihood that negotiations will reach an agreement. 
Data
The dataset we use is the 2006 annual survey conducted by the Licensing Foundation, the charitable and educational arm of the Licensing Executives Society (USA & Canada). 6 Its purpose is to develop an improved understanding of the "industry" of licensing in North America. It is directed towards companies and organizations that create intellectual property (IP) and technology directly or are IP asset owners, rather than professional services firms (legal, consulting, etc.). The survey focuses on asking organizations to provide information about their organization and its licensing activity. What is particularly unique about the 5 While market safety certainly plays a role throughout the licensing process, a first-order concern when parties are thinking about starting negotiations is whether they can conduct due diligence in a bilateral environment. If one party perceives high uncertainty regarding the fairness of the deal or if they are unable to consider alternative offers, they might be unwilling to start negotiations. This is because once they start negotiations they will have to reveal crucial information about the deal. Consistent with this intuition, Anton and Yao (1994) find that even in the absence of formal IP protection, it is beneficial for an inventor to disclose some information about their invention, thus suggesting that having effective IP protection is not necessary to start negotiations.
6 The survey is co-designed by Ajay Agrawal and Iain Cockburn. 2006 survey is that a central theme is impediments to licensing. Survey responses provide an interesting and, to our knowledge, unique window into how organizations perceive licensing challenges and the extent to which such challenges affect their licensing activities.
We provide descriptive statistics in Table 1 . We survey 600 technology-oriented organizations that range in size from less than $1 million in revenue to over $10 billion. The average firm in our sample has annual revenues between $1 billion and $10 billion, an R&D budget between $200 million and $500 million, and between 5,000 and 10,000 employees. These firms represent a variety of industries, including energy (11%), healthcare (44%), software & electronics (11%), transportation (3%), and universities (28%). 
Measures
Our analysis focuses on when each market failure highlighted by RGS is salient during the licensing process. Note that not all respondents answer every survey question, hence the varying number of observations across different variables. The response rate tends to drop further into the survey. The response rate for questions regarding deal success and sources of bargaining breakdown is around 70 %. There are no obvious differences in industry affiliation and firm size between responders and non-responders of the deal success questions.
8 Note that we construct all of our variables from discrete categories of survey responses. For details on variable construction, please consult Appendix B. Our key explanatory variables correspond to the market features outlined by RGS.
Level of market thickness. Market thickness is a difficult phenomenon to measure and is highly context-specific. Here, we focus on a section of the survey that asks respondents to compare IP transactions to transactions for tangible assets, such as leasing real estate or contracting for use of a specialized production facility. 10 We measure lack of market thickness by whether respondents agree to the statement that: "There are usually fewer potential buyers/sellers for the IP [relative to tangible assets]." The variable takes on a value of 1 if the respondent agrees, and 0 otherwise. This measure largely corresponds with
Roth's definition of market thickness, since it captures whether the market for ideas has a sufficient volume of buyers and sellers. Note that it does not reflect whether there is demand for IP but simply whether enough participants are in the market.
Bargaining frictions (congestion).
We capture different types of transaction costs that arise during the bargaining process, some of which correspond to key dimensions of congestion described by RGS. In the early stages of the bargaining process, the salient transaction cost arises from acquiring sufficient information. As a result of the heterogeneity of technology or ideas available on the market and the cost of observing comparable transactions, substantial information asymmetry exists in the market for ideas. This is reflected by the cost and difficulty of conducting due diligence in the absence of a multilateral exchange environment.
As with market thickness, these costs are not easy to measure directly, and again we look to responses to questions that compare licensing transactions to transactions in tangible assets. Specifically, we capture this implication of congestion by whether respondents agree to this statement: "Due diligence will be much more difficult/costly for the IP deal [relative to tangible assets]." The variable takes on a value of 1 if the respondent agrees, and 0 otherwise.
In later stages of the bargaining process, key transaction costs are associated with opportunism and contracting problems. As noted by Gans and Stern (2010) , the degree of congestion is related to whether exchanges take place in the shadow of an endogenous outside option for both parties. This is reflected by either deal breakdown due to better alternatives emerging for one or more parties or time running out before a deal is completed. We measure these bargaining frictions by responses to some of the survey questions that ask respondents to identify reasons for negotiation breakdowns. One section of the survey asks:
"Over the past 12 months, when substantive licensing negotiations have failed to reach an executed agreement, in what percentage of cases was the breakdown due to 'better alternatives emerged for one or more parties or delay (i.e., the clock ran out)."' The respondents
answer by choosing between several discrete response categories (0%, 1-5%, 5-25%, ,75-99%, 100%); we use the mid-point of these response category ranges.
We also examine other potential sources of bargaining breakdown, such as disagreement over financial and non-financial terms, having too many parties at the table, legal and regulatory problems, poor negotiating skills, lack of trust, and ego.
11
Lack of market safety. We measure a lack of market safety by responses to the question:
"Of the IP that your organization would like to license but cannot, approximately what fraction would you say is not effectively protectable by patents, trade secrets, etc.?" This measure corresponds closely to the RGS definition because effective intellectual property protection increases the likelihood that market participants will disclose their preferences truthfully, minimizing the likelihood that they will engage in ex post opportunistic behavior once the seller reveals important details of the idea during the course of a negotiation. The respondents answer by choosing between several discrete response categories (0%, 1-5%, 5-25%, ,75-99%, 100%); we use the mid-point of these response category ranges.
We control for a number of factors that may affect our key relationships.
11 See Appendix B for corresponding survey questions.
Demand for IP. One concern when estimating the relationship between market thickness and market failures is that we might be confounding a thin market with a lack of demand for IP. The distinction is that a market can have a low volume of transactions even in the presence of many potential buyers and sellers due to low demand for a technology, just as a market can have few potential buyers and sellers despite the fact that there is high demand for a technology. We control for the demand for IP by responses to the following question:
"Of the IP that your organization would like to license but cannot, approximately what fraction would you say has no discernible demand from end-users?"
Organization size. To address the concern that large firms might be better at participating in the market for ideas because they have more resources to find buyers and sellers and enforce effective IP protection, we include four measures of firm size: revenue, R&D budget, number of employees, and number of licensing professionals employed.
Industry. Similarly, some industries may have certain institutions that facilitate more effective use of the market for ideas. For example, we know that firms in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have traditionally conducted negotiations on a bilateral basis (Gans and Stern, 2000) , whereas semiconductor firms have not historically relied heavily on patents to appropriate the returns to R&D (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) , which may suggest that they have other ways of ensuring market safety. We include five industry indicator variables that take on a value of 1 if the firm's focal activities are in that industry. The industries represented are energy, software & electronics, healthcare, transportation, and university & government. The omitted category in all specifications is university & government.
Empirical strategy
As we discussed above, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to identify any causal relationships. Instead, our empirical strategy is to use salient correlations to gain insights into our research question. The main estimating equation is: 
Descriptive evidence
Before turning to the regression analysis, it is useful to provide some basic intuition of the effect of each market feature on different stages of the licensing transaction using summary statistics. We categorize firms based on the degree of deal success. We classify a firm as having high deal success if the measure of deal success is greater than the median percentage 12 In models not presented in the paper, we run additional regressions using linear probability models, logit models, and ordered probit models, each with both binary and continuous versions of the main independent variables. We also run an ordered probit model with known thresholds, which allows us to accurately specify the thresholds of our survey response categories rather than treating them as unknown (see http://www.applied-ml.com/download/amldoc.pdf). In order to alleviate concerns of respondents specific propensities to answer high or low on rating scales, we jointly estimate the effect of market features on all three stages of the licensing transaction with a random respondent effect common across all three equations. We also try logged transformations of our dependent variable to ensure we are not estimating beyond the survey category boundaries (e.g., less than 0% or greater than 100%). Our results are largely consistent across all models and specifications.
category. Recall that our measures of deal success are the level of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensor/licensee, the level of negotiations started once potential licensors/licensees are found, and the level of agreements reached once negotiations are started. Tables A1-A3 in Appendix A present the means of our measures of lack of market thickness, lack of market safety, and bargaining frictions for each of the three dependent variables, respectively. In almost all cases, firms in the low-deal success category are more likely to experience market thinness, lack of market safety, and bargaining frictions, relative to firms in the high-deal success category. However, the relative magnitude in differences of means varies for each dependent variable, suggesting that the relative importance of market thickness, bargaining frictions, and market safety varies at each stage of the licensing transaction. Table A1 focuses on the first stage of the licensing process and shows that firms with a high level of IP and an identifiable licensor/licensee are less likely to experience market thinness (75.8%) than firms with a low level of IP and an identifiable licensor/licensee (93.0%). Table   A2 shows that firms with a high level of negotiations started are less likely to experience market thinness, lack of market safety, and congestion than those with a low level of success at this stage. However, the greatest difference for firms that experience deal failures at the second stage of the licensing transaction is that firms with a high level of negotiations started are much less likely to experience various bargaining frictions compared to firms with a low level of negotiations started. For example, firms with a high level of negotiations started are less likely to find due diligence to be more costly (71.2%) and experience bargaining breakdown from too many parties at the negotiating table (3.101), 13 relative to firms with a low level of negotiations started (86.5% and 6.886, respectively).
In the third stage ( 
Main results: Market features and licensing stages
We now turn to our regression analysis for a more nuanced examination of the link between market features and deal failure. In Table 2 , we consider each of the three discrete stages of the licensing process, respectively: 1) identifying a potential buyer/seller, 2) initiating negotiations, and 3) reaching an agreement. The dependent variable in each table corresponds to our measure of an organization's success rate at each stage of the licensing process: 1) the fraction of unlicensed IP with at least one potential licensor/licensee identified, 2) the rate at which negotiations are started once potential licensors/licensees are found, and 3) the fraction of negotiations started that ultimately result in a completed agreement.
Market thickness
Our results are consistent with our main conjectures about the structural features of the market for ideas. Lack of market thickness appears to be most important in the first stage of the licensing process since it is the only market feature that is correlated with deal success at this stage and is not significant in any other stage. In the first stage, firms are seeking to identify potential buyers and sellers of their technology. If the market does not have a sufficient volume of potential buyers and sellers, then there is a higher probability that firms will be unable to find suitable participants to transact with, leading to a higher rate of unlicensed IP. Although market thickness might also influence the efficiency of negotiations in the latter stages due to the shadow of competition, our estimates indicate thickness is less relevant then, likely because bilateral secrecy (Anton and Yao, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2000) curtails the influence of potential outside parties and limits the ability of participants to consider alternative offers.
Market safety
Lack of market safety is most salient in the third stage. In this last stage of the licensing process, where substantive negotiations have started, the seller reveals material information about the technology. Negotiating parties may be less likely to reach an agreement when sellers are hesitant to provide full disclosure due to expropriation risks (or buyers are hesitant to pay after they have appropriated), consistent with Arrow's Paradox (Arrow, 1962) . Thus, effective market safety in the form of IP protection provides a way to limit such behavior ex ante. Interestingly, the protection of IP seems to be correlated with neither the ability to identify a potential buyer/seller nor the likelihood of initiating negotiations. In other words, market participants do not seem to anticipate the problems that may arise in reaching an agreement downstream in the process.
Bargaining frictions
Various bargaining frictions are correlated with deal failure in the negotiation stage. In particular, we find firms that are most likely to fail to initiate negotiations are the ones that have higher perceived costs of due diligence. An implication of conducting deals in the market for intangibles relative to the product market is that participants face higher levels of uncertainty and heterogeneity regarding the prospects of a deal. As a result, market participants face a higher cost of conducting due diligence, which is exacerbated by the bilateral exchange environment. Thus, even if potential buyers and sellers of IP have been identified, participants are less likely to initiate negotiations and reach deal completion if the marginal cost of carrying out due diligence is high. The inability to arrive at mutually acceptable financial terms as well as too many parties at the table are also salient frictions in the second stage. Interestingly, none of these frictions are correlated with deal failure in the final stage of the process (reaching an agreement). Instead, frictions caused by IP problems stemming from enforceability and validity that arise during due diligence are salient in the final stage. Surprisingly, market participants do not seem to anticipate these problems, since these frictions are not correlated with deal failure in the first stage of the licensing process (identifying a buyer/seller). Also, we do not find evidence that "delay" and "better alternatives emerged for one or more parties" to be correlated to our measures of deal success. Furthermore, frictions related to behavioral elements, such as, "lack of trust", "poor negotiating skills", and "ego", although often cited by practitioners as a common source of deal failure (LESI, 2002) , are not associated with reported rates of deal success at any stage. Taken together, this suggests that bargaining frictions in licensing are mainly shaped by the cost of assessing the deal in a bilateral environment.
Selection
A natural concern for observing a lower level of deal success in the first stage is that the unlicensed IP is of low quality. If this is true, then poor-quality deals, rather than a lack of market thickness, are associated with low-deal success. After all, the skewness of ideas has long been established (Scherer, 1965) . We take a step towards addressing this concern by limiting the sample to firms that have at least 5-25% of negotiations reaching an agreement (Table 3) . By focusing on firms that achieve a minimum level of agreements, we reduce the concern that high rates of deal failures early on is mainly attributable to a preponderance of low-quality IP in the firm's portfolio. The estimated coefficients using this restricted sample are similar to those generated from using the full sample. Further, raising the threshold to firms with at least 25-50% of negotiations reaching an agreement does not change the main findings. 
Mediating factors: Organization type and industry effects
Finally, we explore how the relationship between deal failure and market features is mediated by organization type (universities versus firms) and industry type (healthcare versus software & electronics). Jensen and Thursby (2001) document that university technologies are often licensed at an "embryonic" stage, frequently even before patent applications are filed. We find that universities are less likely than firms to be able to identify potential buyers for their IP (Table 4 , Column 1). This is likely due to greater difficulties in establishing productmarket fit due to the early-stage nature of the inventions. The predicted probability of deal success in the first stage is roughly 20 % less for universities compared to firms; in other words, university technologies are more likely to be orphaned. We examine university licensing outcomes in the latter two stages of the licensing process in Columns 2 and 3. In the final stage, universities are 31 % more likely to reach an executed agreement relative to firms. To possibly explain this difference in the final stage, Thursby and Thursby (2002) , Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2003) , and Thursby, Thursby, and Gupta-Mukherjee (2007) describe various aspects of the incentives facing faculty, technology transfer officers, and university administrators to license university inventions, which seem sufficiently distinct from the incentives faced by firms. Not only do many universities count utilization, as opposed to profit maximization of their inventions as a primary objective, they also do not consider downstream product market competition an alternative to licensing for extracting rents from their intellectual property, unlike many firms.
In Table 5 , we restrict the sample to only healthcare and IT (software & electronics)
firms. 15 We know from prior literature that these two markets operate quite differently in terms of technology licensing. Firms in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries traditionally conduct negotiations on a bilateral basis (Gans and Stern, 2000) , whereas IT firms historically have not relied as heavily on patents to appropriate their returns to R&D (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001 ). The main result here is that in the final stage of reaching an executed licensing agreement, healthcare firms are more harmed than IT firms by a lack of market safety (Column 6). This may be because the IT industry also engages in a variety of substitute approaches for patent protection, such as rapid innovation and versioning.
Furthermore, we find that lack of market safety is also negatively correlated with deal success for healthcare firms in the first stage (Column 2), suggesting that firms may to some extent be able to anticipate the problems that might arise due to a lack of market safety.
Conclusion and Implication
When do deal failures occur in the licensing process? Despite theory and anecdotal evidence suggesting that the market for ideas is prone to failure, sources of licensing frictions on the rate of deal success have not been systematically examined empirically. Furthermore, little research exists on when during the licensing process market failures occur. We bring rare firm-level licensing data to shed light on this topic and gain several novel insights.
First, we show that structural market features are important in explaining sources of deal failure in the market for ideas by providing the first application of data to the RGS framework. Second, we divide the licensing process into three stages: 1) identifying a buyer/seller, 2) initiating negotiations, and 3) reaching an agreement. We use this disaggregation of the process to pinpoint when each market feature is most salient and show that the relationship between deal success and market features varies uniquely across these stages. In particular, thickness is most important in Stage 1, bargaining frictions in Stages 2 and 3, and safety in Stage 3. We propose an explanation for this stage-wise variation in the relationship between market features and deal failure.
Market thickness is most salient in the first stage of the licensing process, where firms search for potential buyers and sellers of technology. Since it is more difficult to identify potential trading partners in a thin market, there is a higher probability that firms will be unable to find suitable participants to transact with, leading to a higher stock of unlicensed IP. While attracting a trading partner to the negotiation table and reaching an agreement is more likely in the shadow of competition, technology-licensing negotiations are often characterized by bilateral secrecy, which curtails the influence of potential outside parties and limits the ability of participants to consider alternative offers.
Market safety is critical in the last stage of reaching an agreement. After substantive negotiations have started, a seller reveals critical information about the technology. When information about market participants' preferences or type can be exploited, both buyers and sellers tend to disclose this information strategically. Having a safe market through effective intellectual property protection provides an ex post mechanism to mitigate disclosure concerns, consequently increasing the likelihood that negotiations will reach an agreement.
We do not find evidence that market safety affects the efficiency of earlier stages, suggesting that market participants do not seem to anticipate the problems that may arise in reaching an agreement.
Various bargaining frictions are correlated with the fraction of negotiations started. We find that the firms most likely to fail to initiate negotiations are the ones that have higher perceived costs of due diligence, perhaps because they have less experience or in-house capability (and thus a higher marginal cost to carry out due diligence). Surprisingly, "delay" and "better alternatives emerging" do not appear to impact the rate of deal success. Behavioral characteristics such as "lack of trust", "poor negotiating skills", and "ego" also do not appear to be correlated with our measures of deal success. Taken together, this suggests that the main bargaining friction is mainly shaped by the cost of assessing the deal in a bilateral environment.
Finally, we show that the relationship between deal failure and market features is mediated by organization type (universities versus firms) and industry type (healthcare versus software & electronics) in ways we would expect, given their economic properties. We find that universities are more likely to experience failure in the first stage (identifying a potential licensee). However, once universities initiate negotiation, they are less likely to experience failure, likely because due diligence problems are less severe for universities due to their transparency. We also find healthcare deals are more dependent on market safety than those involving electronics or software. In other words, healthcare deals are less likely to reach completion when the IP in question is not effectively protectable by patents or trade secrets.
Readers should interpret our results with caution, as data limitations preclude us from drawing causal inferences. Nevertheless, our correlations offer evidence that is consistent with the causal interpretations suggested by the theory. We are also unveil a more nuanced picture on how market imperfections impact different stages of technology licensing. We believe our results provide suggestive evidence that deal failure is not only prevalent in the market for ideas but that also the relative salience of each market feature varies at different stages of the licensing process. Importantly, this suggests systematic challenges for market participants in discrete stages of the market for ideas.
How can these trading frictions be minimized? A growing number of firms that participate in technology licensing have begun to utilize online marketplaces that facilitate trades between buyers and sellers. Additionally, developing the capabilities of a firm's licensing team and selecting appropriate legal counsel may be crucial during the negotiation stages of the licensing process in order to mitigate due diligence costs. Many of the problems currently experienced by firms arise from lack of information; very often, this is information about prices and transactions in the market for technology. Information problems suggest an important role for policy initiatives directed at increasing transparency through better public reporting of IP transactions and their economic impact. Government policy also may be able to improve the functioning of markets for technology by supporting the development of critical market infrastructure, such as low cost, timely and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms, and insurance against certain types of risks (akin to real estate markets, where many jurisdictions support title insurance to protect purchasers from legal and technical errors in transactions). Finally, policy makers can play an important role in reducing uncertainty about the scope, validity, and enforceability of IP rights through reform of patent law, building consensus around patent valuation, and active exploration of new technologies and processes to improve patent examination (Cockburn, 2007) .
In future work, we plan to explore the relative importance of alternative forms of intellectual property protection (i.e., copyrights and trade secrets) on rates of deal success across various licensing stages. We also hope to identify empirical indicators for the characteristics of ideas noted by (Gans and Stern, 2010 ) -idea complementarity, value rivalry, and user reproducibility, which are likely to pose distinct challenges for the efficient operation of the market for ideas. We believe the analyses of these issues are not only important to the study of idea dissemination but also vital to understanding an increasingly economically significant and complex market. Notes: We have converted survey responses into continuous variables. The mean annual revenue corresponds to the category $1B-10B. The mean annual R&D budget corresponds to the category $200M-500M. The average number of employees in our sample corresponds to the category 5,000-10,000. The average number of licensing professionals employed corresponds to the category 10-25. See Appendix B for survey questions that correspond to the main independent variables. Roth (2007 Roth ( , 2008 ) Gans and Stern (2010) Our paper Market thickness "A market is thick if it brings together a large enough proportion of potential buyers and sellers to produce satisfactory outcomes for both sides of a transaction." (p.2) "Market thickness is the degree to which a large number of buyers and sellers participate within a market, and hence the degree to which each buyer and seller has an opportunity to engage in an effective match." (p. 8) "Lack of market thickness in MfT is most likely caused by ideas complementarity to be of the most value, ideas require matching of complementary assets and complementary ideas." (p.13) Market thickness refers to the volume of potential traders in the market.
Appendix B Data Appendix
Market Safety "A market is safe if the market offers participants incentives to reveal confidential information." (p.2) "Markets are safe when the disclosure of buyers and sellers own preferences or type allows them to seek out favorable matches with other market participants and cannot be directly exploited to undermine bargaining power or allow hold-up." (p.10) "When users can reproduce an idea at a zero or very low marginal cost (ie., high user reproducibility), there are often significant limitations on whether the seller can control how users exploit or distribute the idea." (p.16)
Market safety refers to the degree that the IP is effectively protected, either by formal (ie., patents) or informal (ie., trade secrets) intellectual property rights.
Noncongestion
"The market needs to give market participants enough time or the means to conduct transactions fast enough to make satisfactory choices when faced with a variety of alternatives. Congestion is usually brought about by thickness." (p.2) "Congestion arises when the timing or circumstances of potential trades requires that trades are completed without access to alternative options in the marketplace. While a prerequisite for a lack of congestion is market thickness (i.e., sufficient traders in a market are required to make bargaining with others worthwhile), the degree of congestion also depends on the precise rules and timing of the market mechanism. (p.9) "The main consequence of value rivalry is congestion. In the MfT, buyers and sellers have to engage in bilateral negotiations in order to preserve the value of the idea. These due diligence periods imply that the detailed negotiations over the precise terms and conditions of a license take place in a bilateral rather than multilateral environment. This results in poor quality matches and uncertainty regarding the fair price of an idea of a given quality." (p.15)
We think of congestion as largely arising from frictions during the bargaining process between buyers and sellers. We capture different types of transaction costs arising from the bargaining process that also corresponds to key dimensions of congestion described by Roth (2007) and Gans and Stern (2010) . In early stages of the bargaining process, the salient transaction cost stems from acquiring sufficient information about the deal. This is reflected in the market for ideas context by the cost and difficulty of conducting due diligence in the absence of a multilateral environment. In later stages, the main transaction cost stems from contracting problems and opportunism. This is reflected in the market for ideas context by deal breakdown due to better alternatives emerging for one or more parties and time running out before a deal is completed. 
